MuddyWater compromised the network infrastructure of several critical organizations across the United States, Canada, and Israel. The intrusions deployed two distinct, custom-developed backdoors targeting a strategically diverse portfolio of entities, including a software development company that provides technology solutions to the defense and aerospace sectors.Â
Broadcom’s Symantec and Carbon Black security researchers have attributed this activity, which has maintained persistence since at least early February, to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)-affiliated group. The reuse of digital certificates previously associated with MuddyWater operations has established a high-confidence attribution assessment.
MuddyWater, also known as Seedworm, Temp Zagros, and Static Kitten, disseminated a previously unknown implant designated Dindoor within the network environments of:
A separate Python-based backdoor, Fakeset, was discovered within the network infrastructures of:
An attempted data exfiltration operation from the compromised software company was documented during the investigation. While the initial access vector remains unconfirmed, the group has historically employed phishing.
These U.S. and Israeli network compromises provided threat actors with operational positioning to conduct either sustained intelligence exfiltration or execute disruptive attacks in response to geopolitical developments, following which researchers have warned of retaliatory cyberattacks.
In an October 2025 campaign, MuddyWater’s espionage campaign targeted more than 100 government entities across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) with spear-phishing attacks using a compromised email to distribute a custom backdoor known as Phoenix.
Reports in 2024 revealed that MuddyWater’s phishing campaign targeting Israeli organizations deployed a previously undocumented, tailor-made backdoor.
In other recent news, suspected Iranian threat actors compromised IP camera feeds in Iran, Israel, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain.Â